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ABSTRACT
Incentive effects of pension systems are usually estimated under the assumption that the institutional
environment provides a single optimal “pathway” for retirement.  However, many countries provide
competing pathways which may include several early retirement options in addition to normal retirement.
Moreover, early retirement options often comprise special provisions for disabled and unemployed workers
that can be strategically manipulated by the employer and the employee while ultimate eligibility for such
provisions is uncertain in advance.
This paper shows that ignoring the endogeneity and/or uncertainty in the relevant institutional setting
can severely bias the estimates of incentive effects.  Ignoring the endogeneity leads to overestimated
incentive effects that unduly exaggerate the “pull” view of early retirement.  In turn, when the uncertain
option set is specified too generously, incentive effects are underestimated.  The paper proposes several
estimates to bound the true incentive effects of social security on early retirement, and applies them to the
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1. Introduction
In most industrialized countries, old age labor force participation has declined dra-
matically during the last decades. Together with population aging, this puts the social security
systems of the industrialized countries under a double threat: Retirees receive pensions for a
longer time while there are less workers per retiree to shoulder the financial burden of the
pension systems. The decline of old-age labor force participation has therefore turned atten-
tion to the incentive effects of social security systems: Is a significant part of the threat
homemade because pension systems provide overly strong incentives to retire early? This
,,pull" view —laborsupply has declined because early retirement provisions pull old workers
out of employment —isin contrast to the ,,push" view —asecularly declining demand for la-
bor has created unemployment, and one form is to push older workers into early retirement.
The pull view is prominently put forward in a recent volume edited by Gruber and
Wise (1998). The authors from eleven countries argue that the declining old age labor force is
strongly correlated with the incentives created by generous early retirement provisions. For-
mal econometric analyses (e.g.: Stock and Wise, 1990, for the US; Meghir and Whitehouse,
1997, for the UK; Borsch-Supan, 1992, 1999, for Germany) find strongly significant coeffi-
cients of variables measuring the incentive effects of pension rules,e.g.the option value to
postpone retirement.
Incentive effects of pension rules are usually estimated under the assumption that the
institutional environment provides a single optimal "pathway" for retirement. This optimal
pathway then defines present values of retirement income at any retirement age, or an option
value of postponing retirement at any prospective retirement age. However, most countries
provide competing pathways which include several early retirement options in addition to
normal retirement, typically at age 65.
Kohli et al. (1991) have stressed the variety of these pathway options across Europe.
Figure 1 shows how important these different exit routes or pathways are in Germany. It isparticularly impressive that early retirement due to a disability before age 60 (denoted by DI-
2) was the most common pathway in most of the years 1958-1994, while ,,normal" retirement
(denoted by NR) has a share of less than 20 percent since the mid 1970s. Early retirement due
to unemployment (denoted by UN) increased steeply in the early 1 990s and accounted for
another roughly 20 percent of labor market exits. Complicating this picture even more, the
exit routes depicted in Figure 1 are frequently preceded by pre-retirement schemes. These
schemes are industry- or company-specific and are popular not only in Germany but also in
many other European countries.
0% .
1958
Note: The figure shows the share of pathways by year. The shaded areas are (from top to
bottom) NR: Normal retirement; FR:flexibleretirement (only after the 1972 reform); UN: early
retirement because of unemployment; DI-1:earlyretirement because of an onset of disability
after age 60 (only after the 1972 reform); DI-2: early retirement because of an onset of disabil-
ity before age 60. Source:Verbanddeutscher Rentenversicherungstrager, 1997.
Whenmeasuring incentive effects, there are two distinct problems associatedwiththis
multitude ofexitroutes.First,early retirement optionssuch as thespecialprovisions for dis-
abled and unemployed workers caneffectivelybestrategic variables for the employer and the
employee.Employers may have an incentive to let the social security system pay for the costs
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20% DI-2of restructuring their work force, while employees may have an incentive to enjoy leisure
early on the expense of the contributors to the social security system. As a result, constructs
of incentive effects that rely on indicators for the availability of a certain pathway are endoge-
nous. Prime example for such an indicator is the reported health status, often measured as the
extent of disability in percent of full work ability. This is frequently the legal prerequisite for
early retirement and can be manipulated at least to some extent as has been controversially
discussed by Bound (1989) and Parsons (1991). The complicated interaction between health
and the eligibility for disability benefits has been documented by a working group led by John
Rust (Benitez aet al., 1998) as a prerequisite for a structural estimation of incentive effects due
to disability benefits improving on the large U.S. literature on this topic (see Parsons, 1982;
Halpern and Hausman, 1986; Stem, 1989; Rust, 1990; and Rust and Phelan, 1997).
A second technical problem associated with the multitude of exit routes is that the
choice of a specific pathway to retirement is made when it is not clear whether certain options
are actually relevant for the individual contemplating early retirement. Again, disability is the
prime example: even if the reported health status has not been manipulated, econometricians
face the problem that the outcome of the screening process for eligibility is far from certain ex
ante. If econometricians specify the option set too generously, they exaggerate the incentives
at work and thus undercstimete the coefficient of the incentive variable. In turn, incentive
effects may be overestimated --andthus the the pull view of early retirement --ifthe option
set is too restrictive.
This paper shows that ignoring the uncertainty and endogeneity of the relevant institu-
tional setting --i.e.,the available pathways --canseverely bias the estimates of incentive ef-
fects. The paper focuses on the disability option that provides particularly strong incentives.
It proposes several estimates to bound the ,,true" incentive effects of social security on early
retirement in the face of uncertainty, and it uses an approximate two-stage procedure to tackle
the endogeneity problem.
Section 2 provides the institutional background of the German pension system and the
early retirement incentives it creates. Section 3 introduces the data, a sample of German
workers aged 5 5-70 drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and describes
patterns of retirement, disability and health in the sample. Section 4 presents estimation rc-
'13suits for several specifications aimed at correcting for uncertainty and endogeneity of the dis-
ability benefit eligibility. Section 5 concludes and draws policy recommendations.
2. Incentives Created by the German Public Pension System
The German public pension system is particularly well-suited for a microeconometric
study of incentive effects on labor force participation because it is almost universal and we do
not need to account for a variety of firm pension plans that create their own incentive effects
but are usually not well captured in survey data (Borsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1998). The
homogeneity arises for two reasons. First, the German public pension system is mandatory
for every worker except for the self-employed and those with very small labor incomes. Be-
cause almost all German workers have been dependently employed at least at some point in
their working career, almost every worker has a claim on a public pension. Second, the system
has a very high replacement rate, generating net retirement incomes that are currently about
70 percent of pre-retirement net earnings for a worker with a 45-year earnings history and
average life-time earnings. This is substantially higher than the corresponding U.S. net re-
placement rate of about 53 percent. In addition, the system provides relatively generous sur-
vivor benefits that constitute a substantial proportion of the total pension liability. As a result,
social security income represents about 80 percent of household income of households headed
by a person aged 65 and over, the remainder about equally divided among firm pensions, asset
income, and private transfers.
Until 1972, retirement was mandatory at age 65. Early retirement was possible and
frequent through the disability pathway, see Figure 1. With the landmark 1972 pension re-
form, several early retirement options were introduced. Figure 1 shows that early retirement
almost instantaneously substituted for a considerable portion of disability benefits —afairly
strong indication that disability status was not only related to health. The pension system es-
tablished in 1972 now provides old-age pensions for workers aged 60 and older and disability
henejIls for workers below age 60, that are converted to old-age pensions latest at age 65.
The main feature of the old-age pensions is "flexible retirement" from age 63 for
workers with a long service history. In addition, retirement at age 60 is possible for women,
unemployed workers, and workers who cannot be appropriately employed for health or labor
market reasons. It is noteworthy that these features were introduced by the 1972 reform as
4social achievements beforeunemploymentstarted to rise in the mid-seventies. Only later, one
realized that they helped to keep the unemployment rate down. 20 years after the introduction
of the various early retirement options, the 1992 pension reform is attempting to close some of
the early retirement options. However, the effects are irrelevant for our sample as they will
only be visible after the year 2004.
Old-age pension benefits are computed on a life-time contribution basis. They are the
product of four elements: (1) the employee's relative wage position, averaged over the entire
earnings history, (2) the number of years of service life, (3) several adjustment factors, and (4)
the average pension level. The first three factors make up the "personal pension base" which
is calculated when entering retirement. Old-age pensions are proportional to length of service
life, a specific feature of the German pension system. The fourth factor determines the in-
come distribution between workers and pensioners in general and is adjusted annually to net
wages. Thus, productivity gains are transferred each year to all pensioners, not only to new
entrants. Due to a generous exemption, social security benefits are tax free unless income
from other sources is high.
Early retirement incentives are created by the (lack of) adjustment factors. Before the
1992 pension reform, there was no explicit adjustment of benefits when a worker retired ear-
lier than at age 65, except for a bonus when retirement was postponed from ages 65or66 by
one year. Nevertheless, because benefits are proportional to the years of service, a worker ith
fewer years of service would get lower benefits even before the bonus. With a constant in-
come profile and 40 years of service, each year of earlier retirement decreased pension bene-
fits by 2.5 percent. This is substantially less than the actuarial adjustment which increases
from about 5.5 percent for postponing retirement one year at age 60 to 8 percent for postpon-
ing retirement one year at age 65.The1992 pension reform will gradually change this by
introducing retirement age-specific adjustment factors to the benefit formula. However, they
will remain about 2 percent below those required for actuarial fairness. Figure 2 displays ac-
tuarial adjustments as well as those under the current (i.e., relevant for our working sample)
and future institutional settings.
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Notes:,,RR1972" denotes the adjustment factors introduced by the 1972 Pension
Reform, ,,RR1992" symbolizes the adjustments that will be phased in by the 1992
Pension Reform, and ,,Fair" refers to actuarially fair adjustment factors,
Disability pensions before reaching age 60 are particularly generous. First, the service
life used in a similar computation as for old-age pensions is extended by the time between the
onset of the disability and age 60, albeit at a reduced earnings base at two thirds of the last
earnings. Second, disability benefits are not actuarially adjusted, even after the 1992 reform,
but are computed as if the worker had retired at age 60. Disability pensions after age 60 are
computed like old-age pensions, but without actuarial adjustments.
The key statistic to measure the early retirement incentives exerted by the actuarially
unfair adjustment factors is the change in social security wealth. If social security wealth de-
clines because the increase in the annual pension is not large enough to offset the shorter time
of pension receipt, workers have a financial incentive to retire earlier. We define social secu-
rity wealth as the expected present discounted value of benefits minus applicable contribu-
tions. Seen from the perspective of a worker who is S years old and plans to retire at age R,
social security wealth (SSW) is
SSW.(R)= YRET,(R)-a, .ö' - c.YLAB1 a,
/= 1?
with:55W present discounted value of retirement benefits (=social security wealth),
S planning age,
R retirement age,
YLAB1 labor income at age t,






1,2contribution rate to pension system at age t,
probability to survive at least until age t given survival until age S.
discount factor =1/(1+r).
The accrual rate of social security wealth between age t- 1 and t is
ACCR(t) =[SSW(t)-SSWS(t-l)]/ SSW'(t-1).
A negative accrual can be interpreted as a tax on further labor force participation. It is par-
ticularly handy to express this as an implicit tax rate: the ratio of the (negative) social security
wealth accrual to the net wages (YLABNT) that workers would earn if they would postpone
retirement by one year
TAXRS(t) =- [SSWS(t)-SSW5(t-1)1/ YLAB1T.
Figure 3 shows that the early retirement incentives created by the old-age pension
formula in Germany are strong. We will see below, that the incentives created by disability
benefits are even stronger. The accrual function (left panel) has three distinctive kink points.
The first kink occurs at age 60, the earliest retirement age into the public pension system
without disability status. Two other kinks are generated by the bonus for postponing retire-
ment at ages 65 and 66, interrupting the steady increase in negative pension wealth accrual.
Figure 3: Loss in Social Security Wealth When Postponing Retirement,
(1972 Rules, Old-Age Pensions only)
Accrual Rate Implicit Tax Rate
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of pension wealth during the early retirement window at a rate reaching -9 percent when re-
tirement is postponed from age 64 to 65. In 1995, this was a loss of about DM 22,000 (US $
10,500 at purchasing power parity) for the average worker. Expressed as a percentage of an-
nual labor income, the loss corresponds to a ,,tax" which exceeds 50 percent.
The 1992 Pension Reform will moderate but not abolish this incentive effect. After
2004, when the 1992 reform will have fully be phased in, the negative accrual rate will reach -
5 percent,corresponding to an implicit tax rate of almost 30 percent when retirement is post-
poned by one year at age 64.
Disability benefits create even stronger labor supply disincentives. The resulting im-
plicit tax rates for postponing retirement are very large, see Figure 4. They are likely to create
strong incentives to manipulate disability eligibility: if there is a chance to claim disability,
not taking it corresponds to a 60 percent implicit tax on earnings.
80%
Figure 4: Implicit TaxonPostponing Retirement, Disability Case
Note: See text for definition of implicit tax rate TAXR().
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
How do these incentives affect actual retirement behavior? We use the 1984-1996
waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to tackle this question. The German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual panel study of some 6000 households and some
15000 individuals. Its design closely corresponds to the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics (PSID). Response rates and panel mortality are also comparable to the PSID. The GSOEP
data provide a detailed account of income and employment status. The data is used exten-
sively in Germany, and the increasing interest in the U.S. prompted the construction of an
English-language user file available from Richard Burkhauser and his associates at Syracuse
University. Burkhauser (1991) reports on the usefulness of the German panel data and pro-
vides English-language code books for the internationally accessible GSOEP version. Since
1990, the West German panel was augmented by an East German sample.
For this paper, however, we only use West German workers because pre-retirement is
frequent in East Germany and we lack the necessary company-specific information to describe
the incentives appropriately. Our working sample consists of all West Germans, who arc aged
55to70 years and have at least one spell of employment in this "window" in order to recon-











55 60 65 70unbalanced panel of these individuals with 8577 observations and an average observation time
of 5.3 years. A few sample persons are right-truncated with respect to retirement, i.e., they are
employed throughout the entire window period —butmost individuals retire before the age of
70. Of the 1987 individuals, 666 have no transitions, 643 have a single transition from em-
ployment to retirement, and 301 individuals have more complex histories with at least one
reverse transition. 35 percent are female, and the most frequent retirement age is age 60.
We define a worker to be "retired" when the self-reported employment status is "out of
labor force". This includes unemployment workers and workers on pre-retirement who may
not receive public pensions but other support ranging from unemoployement benefits to sev-
erance pay. Figure 5 depicts the percentage of retired persons in our working sample and
shows three distinct jumps: the largest at age 60, and two smaller ones at ages 63 and 65,cor-
responding to the earliest ages in which the eligibility to various pension types begins, see
Section 2. There are very few individuals working after age 65. These patterns in our work-
ing sample strongly correspond to administrative records, e.g., VdR (1997). Even before offi-
cial old age retirement begins, about 15 percent of the workers have retired. This percentage
in our working sample is somewhat lower than in the administrative records, depicted in Fig-
ure 1, indicating that the working sample underrepresents "problem cases" who retire very










Source: GSOEP 1984-1996,and author's calculations.
6769The jump at age 60 is due to three institutional features. Women with a work history of at
least 15 years may retire at age 60; any unemployed worker may retire at age 60 if certain
mild requirements are satisfied; and, most importantly, workers who are able to claim "old-
age disability" which has weaker health and job status requirements than disability before age
60.
"Disability" is officially measured as percent of earnings capability. If this falls be-
low 50 percent, workers can claim a disability pension after age 60 that corresponds to a nor-
mal pension, without actuarial adjustments. Indeed, the average degree of disability in the
sample increases steadily until age 62 where it reaches 20 percent. After age 63, it increases
much slower, see Figure 6.
Figure 6: Average Degree of Disability by Age (Percentage)
Source: GSOEP 1984-1996,and author's calculations.
Since it seems implausible that this sudden change is caused by a change in health
status, this pattern suggests an institutional reason. It is easy to find. From age 63on,all
male workers can receive a normal pension, provided they have 35 years of work which most








55 56 57 58 5960 61 62 6364 65 66 67 68 69 70disability and self-reported health. Figure 7 shows that self reported health changes very lit-
tle, and while a regression of the degree of disability on self-reported health features a signifi-








Figure7: Average Self-Reported Health on a Scale 0-10
Source: GSOEP 1984-1996,and author's calculations.
Partly,this weak correlation is due to the fact that disability status is granted not only for
health but also for employment-related reasons. Even healthy workers are classified as "dis-
abled" if there are no jobs available for their specific skills. Leniency in those regulations has
changed frequently and unpredictably. They were subject not only to government policy (e.g.,
in order to manipulate the unemployment rate) but also to law cases (which for example at
some point ruled that earnings tests for disabled workers were illegal).
4. Alternative Estimates of Incentive Effects to Retire Early
The evidence in the previous section suggests that disability is an important mechanism for
early retirement. However, even in the lenient German system, disability is not granted auto-
matically. Only 16 percent in our working sample report a disability status of 50 or more per-
cent. And the discussion at the end of the preceding section has shown that in planning ahead
for the choice of retirement age, it is far from clear whether this exit pathway can be taken.
12Incentives for early retirement thus have a strong element of uncertainty which has to built
into measures of incentive effects.
We capture the economic incentives provided by the pension system by the option
value to postpone retirement (Stock and Wise, 1990). This value captures for each retirement
age the trade-off between retiring now (resulting in a stream of retirement benefits that de-
pends on this retirement age) and keeping all options open for some later retirement date (with
associated streams of first labor, then retirement incomes for all possible later retirement
ages). Consequently, the option value for a specific age is defined as the difference between
the maximum attainable consumption utility if the worker postpones retirement to some later
year minus the utility of consumption that the worker can afford if the worker would retire
now. The definition corresponds closely to the construction of social security wealth in the
preceding section.
Let Vt(R) denote the expected discounted future utility at age t if the worker retires at
age R. Let R* (t) denote the optimal retirement age if the worker postpones retirement past
age t, i.e., max(Vt(r)) for r>t. With this notation, the option value is
G(t) =V,(R'(tfl-(t)
Since a worker is likely to retire as soon as the utility of the option to postponc retirement
becomes smaller than the utility of retiring now, retirement probabilities should depend nega-
tively on the option value.
We specify the expected utility as follows:
,(R) =u(YLAB1.)•3 '+ au(YREI(R)).3
'=R
with YLABS Labor income at age s, s=t...R-l,
YRETS(R)Expected retirement income at age s, s>R,
R Retirement age,
a Marginal utility of leisure, to be estimated,
a Probability to survive at least until age s,
S Discount factor, set at 3 percent.
To capture the utility from leisure, utility during retirement is weighted by a>l, where
I/a is the marginal disutility of work. We use an estimate of a=3.l3 that was obtained by
grid search, see Borsch-Supan (1999). A dollar that has to be earned by work is therefore
valued at only about a third of a dollar that is given as a public transfer through the retirement
13system. This value is somewhat higher than estimates for the U.S. (Stock and Wise, 1990) but
not implausible for Germany with an arguably higher preference for leisure. We apply a very
simple utility function by identifying consumption with income. Preliminary estimates with
an isoelastic utility function, u(Y) =Yr,yield a y coefficient that is not significantly different
from one. Finally, the discount factor ö is assumed to be 3 percent. Other discount factors in
the range between 1 and 6 percent yield qualitatively similar results.
Uncertainty enters the option value through future income. For labor income, we as-
sume this away: it is assumed to be constant after age 55. This is typical for German workers
who have seniority rules that flatten out about this age. However, retirement income depends
on retirement age and the rules applicable to the individual at that age. As stressed before, it
is uncertain which rules will actually apply.
The common procedure in the literature is to use the retirement income according to
the rules that have cx post been applied to the sample individual. This procedure is correct for
fixed personal characteristics. For example, as pointed out in Section 2, German public pen-
sion rules have a more generous retirement age for women than for men. Hence, male persons
are assigned pension rules for males, females likewise.
Similarly, the literature has typically assigned disabled individuals a pension accord-
ing to the rules for disabled workers. However, as opposed to fixed characteristics such as
gender, this procedure ignores both uncertainty and potential endogeneity. First, the option
value approach is an cx ante, not an cx post view of the utility of a certain retirement age. The
cx ante uncertainty cannot be resolved by the econometrician by using its cx post value.
Rather, one needs to use the expected value applicable at the time of decision making. Spe-
cifically, the ability to claim disability status is not certain at age 55, the beginning of our de-
cision window. The retirement income YRET in the above equation should therefore be a
probability-weighted sum of the relevant pathways, in our simple case "disability" and "nor-
mal retirement".
Moreover, as stressed before, eligibility can be manipulated to some extent, and there
are strong incentives to do so. Thus, the probability of taking this pathway is potentially en-
dogenous. We therefore have to use an instrumental variable approach to compute fitted
probabilities of the pathways "disability" and "normal retirement". This leads us to four vari-
ants of the option value to postpone retirement:
14• The tough variant: all individuals are assigned retirement incomes according to normal
retirement rules
• The generous variant: all individuals are assigned retirement incomes as if they could
claim disability benefits
• The endogenous variant: disabled persons are assigned disability pensions, non-disabled
persons normal pensions
• The probabilistic variant: individuals are assigned an expected value, where disability
pensions are weighted by a probabilityp, and normal pensions with (l-p). Taking the en-
dogeneity ofp into account, we use three instrumental variable approaches:
(a) we use the population frequency of being disabled (15.97 percent),
(b) we regress the probability of having a degree of disability of 50 percent or higher on
a cubic polynomial in age and use this fitted values as probability p,
(c) we regress the probability of having a degree of disability of 50 percent or higher on
a cubic polynomial in age, a set of branch and education dummies, plus gender and
marital status, and use this fitted values as probability p.
We then insert the resulting option value into a discrete choice model with "retired" as de-
pendent variable, and add the usual suspects as other explanatory variables: an array of socio-
economic variables such as gender, marital status, wealth (indicator variables of several finan-
cial and real wealth categories) and a self-assessed health measure. Obviously, we cannot use
the legal disability status as a measure of health since this is potentially endogenous.
Inserting the option value in a regression-type model is much less computationally
involved and more practical than the estimation procedure employed by Stock and Wise
(1990) which in turn much closer approximates the underlying dynamic programming struc-
ture (Rust and Phelan, 1997), see Lumbsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992). The regression ap-
proach generates robust estimates of the average effects of the option value on retirement,
although it is inferior in predicting individual choices when incentives vary widely across
individuals.
We begin by using a simple logit model. Table 1 presents a summary, Table 2 the full
range of results.
15Table 1: Option value coefficients for 6 variants of expected retirement income
Estimated coefficient of
option value (std error)
1-Statistic
MODEL 1:,,Generous Variant" 0,0053(0,00115) 4,63
MODEL 2:,,Tough Variant" -0,0046(0,00098) -4,72
MODEL 3:Endogenous Variant -0,0096(0,00080) -12,02
MODEL 4a:p=sample freq. -0,0034(0,00122) -2,79
MODEL 4b:p=age polynomial -0,0038(0,00116) -3,28
MODEL 4c:p=full regression -0,0032(0,00114) -2,84
In the "generous" specification of expected retirement income —everybodyis eligible
for disability benefits" —thesign of the option value coefficient is counterintuitive. All other
specifications have the expected negative sign: an increase in the option value to postpone
retirement decreases the probability of being retired. The probabilistic variants are very close
to each other and are bracketed by the "generous" and the "tough variant". The first-stage R2s
in the last two specifications are 8 and 15 percent, respectively. The "endogenous specifica-
tion", however, is far outside this bracket, considerably larger and with an (apparent) very
high precision as indicated by the t-statistic. The endogeneity bias produces a threefold higher
estimate of the option value coefficient than the probability-weighted specifications.
Table 2 presents the full results. A positive coefficient indicates that the correspond-
ing explanatory variables increases the probability of retirement. In addition to the option
value, health, and an array of socio-econornic variables, we include a full set of age dummies
to non-parametrically capture all other unmeasured effects on the retirement decision that are
systematically related to age. such as social customs. The reference category is age 65.









Option value 0,0053 4,63 -0,0046 -4,72 -0,0096 -12,02
Health -0,1781 -9,83 -0,1803 -9,96 -0,1512 -8,23
Female 0,0995 1,10 0,0434 0,46 0,0277 0,33
Married -0,0404 -0,41 -0,0394 -0,40 -0,0461 -0,47
Education -0,6230 -4,73 -0,6 166 -4,60 -0,5811 -4,23
Civil servant 0,4733 3,29 0,4988 3,38 0,4860 3,22
Firmpension -2,7015-10,15 -2,7712 -10,31 -2,7925 -10,33
Life insurance -0,0997 -1,27 -0,1104 -1,40 -0,1496 -1,88
Stocks/bonds 0,0280 0,30 0,0089 0,09 0,0135 0,14
Real estate -0,8257 -7,55 -0,8019 -7,33 -0,8212 -7,43
Owner occup. 0,3148 3,76 0,3214 3,84 0,3423 4,04
Age￿59 -5,2324-29,33 -4,6547 -21,32 -4,3121 -22,86
Age=60 -3,4990-17,93 -3,2143 -15,51 -3,0945 -15,60
Age=61 -1,8945-10,67 -1,6760 -8,99 -1,5080 -8,33
Age=62 -1,4035 -7,79 -1,2739 -6,93 -1,1792 -6,51
Age=63 -1,0178 -5,48 -1,1048 -5,98 -1,1363 -6.15
Age=64 -0,2414 -1,20 -0,3323 -1,66 -0,3682 -1,84
Age=66 1,4228 4,36 1,3819 4,24 1,3616 4,18
Age=67 0,9167 3,15 0,7985 2,75 0,7402 2,55
Age￿68 1,0680 4,27 1,0241 4,10 1,0025 4,01
Constant 3,1187 14,27 2,9654 13,67 2,7042 12,41
Log likelihood -2338,1 -2336,1 -2271,1
Observations 8577 8577 8577
Notes: Dependent variable is dummy variable ,,retired". Log likelihood value at zero is 5954.1.







Variable Parameter 1-Stat Parameter1-Stat Parameteri-St at
Option value -0,0034-2,79 -0,0038 -3,28 -0,0032 -2,84
Health -0,1813-10,02 -0,1810 -10,01 -0,1804 -9,98
Female 0,1553 1,72 0,1416 1,58 0,1711 1,94
Married -0,0358-0,36 -0,0376 -0,38 -0,0437 -0,44
Education -0,6303-4,74 -0,6295 -4,72 -0,6199 -4,65
Civil servant 0,4691 3,23 0,4719 3,24 0,4493 3,11
Firm pension -2,7551-10,29 -2,7604 -10,31 -2,7516 -10,29
Life insurance -0,1166-1,48 -0,1154 -1,47 -0,1178 -1,50
Stocks/bonds -0,0018-0,02 -0,0007 -0,01 -0,0014 -0,02
Real estate -0,7984 -7,3 1 -0,7993 -7,32 -0,7961 -7,29
Owner occup. 0,3126 3,74 0,3138 3,75 0,3102 3,71
Age59 -4,9478-23,17 -4,8577 -22,30 -4,9335 -23,00
Age60 -3,3805-16,45 -3,3655 -16,52 -3,4124 -16,90
Age=61 -1,8075-9,76 -1,8030 -9,84 -1,8392 -10,11
Age=62 -1,3567-7,38 -1,3548 -7,42 -1,3793 -7,57
Age=63 -1,1024 -5,96 -1,1059 -5,98 -1,1015 -5,96
Age=64 -0,3248 -1,62 -0,3287 -1,64 -0,3238 -1,62
Age=66 1,3876 4,26 1,3860 4,25 1,3875 4,26
Age=67 0,8107 2,79 0,8063 2,77 0,8116 2,79
Age￿68 1,0325 4,13 1,0308 4,12 1,0326 4,13
Constant 2,9713 13,67 2,9662 13,65 2,9718 13,67
Log likelihood -2343,6 -2342,1 -2343,5
Observations 8577 8577 8577
Notes: Dependent variable is dummyvariable ,,retired".Log likelihood value at zero is 5954.1.
Prediction success rates are high and vary from 88.7 to 89.3. This fit compares fa-
vorably to the baseline probability of 67.9 percent of retirees in our working sample. Except
for the difference among the option value coefficients, all other coefficient estimates are fairly
close to each across the six specifications.
18The other economic incentives for retirement, namely the wealth variables, are only
partially significant. The GSOEP data does not contain levels of wealth and provides only
indicators whether certain portfolio components —firmpension, life insurance, stock and
bonds, and real estate —arepresent. There are many missing values, here coded as ,,not pres-
ent". In general, presence of financial and real wealth decreases the retirement probability.
This is not particularly plausible for the presence of a firm pension. However, significant firm
pensions are rare in Germany and usually indicate higher valued jobs in which retirement may
occur later for reasons not related to the firm pension per Se.
The pattern of age dummies reflects the obvious: older workers are more likely retired
than younger ones. It is important to measure the option value with the age dummies included
in order to purge its estimated coefficient from all other non-economic effects. The omission
of age dummies about triples the estimated coefficient of the option value. Quite noticeable is
the lack of any spikes in the pattern of age dummies. In this sense, retirement behavior is cor-
rectly described by the option value, the main economic incentive for retirement.
Most other socio-demographic variables are not significant. The important differences
in social security regulations between men and women (women can retire at age 60 if have at
least 15 years of retirement insurance history, while men need 35 years to retire at age 63,
unless they claim disability) appears to be fully captured by the option value. Marital status
and education is also insignificant. We did not do full justice to the retirement subsystem for
civil servants. They are actually treated as if they were part of the standard social security
system which is not really the case. Civil servants are required to work longer than other em-
ployees, with a fairly rigid retirement age at 65, although claims to disability are frequent as
well as early retirement due to downsizing of the civil service sector. We find an expected
negative coefficient, indicating later retirement for civil servants.
One may be suspicious that a simple logit model biases results because it ignores the
panel nature of our working sample. We therefore employ a panel probit model that permits a
combination of random effects and serial correlation. This model follows Borsch-Supan
(1999) where all necessary econometric details are presented. It is estimated by numerical
simulation methods, see Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993). The model can be inter-
preted as a semi-nonparametric hazard model for multiple spell data permitting unobserved
heterogeneity and state dependence. It is non-parametric in the sense that the model does not
19impose a functional form on the duration in a given state. Fairly flexible hazard rate models
of retirement have been estimated by Sueyoshi (1989) and Meghir and Whitehouse (1997),
however, not in combination with an option value describing the incentives to retire. Para-
metric hazard rate models for German data have been estimated by Schmidt (1995) and
Borsch-Supan and Schmidt (1996).







Variable Parameter 1-Stat Parameter1-Stat Parameter1-Stat
Option value -0,0028-3,38 -0,0110 -6,04 -0,0115 -6,8 1
Health -0,1349 ..9,97 -0,1029 -3,68 -0,0865 -3,26
Female 0,07451]] -0,0678 -0,31 0,1195 0,59
Married -0,0177 -0,23 -0,0153 -0,07 -0,0449 -0,36
Education -0,4115-3,96 -0,6257 -2,00 -0,6020 -1,88
Civil servant 0,3536 3,16 1,0587 3,04 1,0337 2,95
Firm pension -2,0030-10,93 -2,3893 -8,14 -2,2043 -7,95
Life insurance -0,0969-1,62 0,2577 2,00 -0,2123 -1,72
Stocks/bonds -0,0028-0,04 -0,1340 -0,86 -0,1286 -0,89
Real estate -0,6298-7,42 0,9597 5,04 -0,8639 -4,76
Owner occup. 0,2175 3,42 -0,1036 0,55 0,1 138 0,64
Age￿59 -3,8816-24,81 -7,6382 -21,01 -7,2894 -24,02
Age=60 -2,8372-18,24 5,6820-18,00 -5,4844 -20,32
Age=61 -1,5157-10,58 3,1143 12,13 -2,9953 -12,70
Age=62 -1,1331 -7,85 -2,2996 -9,46 -2,2247 -9,79
Age=63 -0,8955 -6,10 2,0115 -8,44 1,9826 -9,05
Age=64 -0,2588 -1,66 -0,4417 -1,84 -0,4516 -2,06
Age=66 0,9843 4,46 1,9338 5,68 1,8089 5,82
Age67 0,5858 2,83 1,3707 4,16 1,3116 4,29
Age￿68 0,7606 4,24 1,8981 6,35 1,8450 6,36
Constant 2,3834 14,46 3,9641 10,87 3,7499 13,94
RAN 2,8358 19,85 2,8356 13,58
ARI 0,6093 10,66
Log likelihood -2350,03 -1808,39 -1778,35
Individuals 8577 1610 1610
Max. periods 1 13 13
Observations 8577 8577 8577
Notes: Dependent variable is the dummy variable ,,retired". Log likelihood value at zero parameter values is
5954.1. All estimates based on 20 replications in simulated maximum likelihood estimator.
Weestimate three models, using the probabilistic version of the option value based on
the full regression (Specification 4c in Tables 1 and 2). Model I has i.i.d. errors and corre-
sponds to the logit model of Table 2b. Note that probit coefficient estimates are smaller by
21the square root of it/6, that is 0.7797, than their logit counterparts. Model 2 corrects for unob-
served heterogeneity by a random effect whose standard deviation is reported at the bottom of
Table 3. Finally, Model 3 adds an autoregressive error component to Model 2. Estimation
results are presented in Table 3.
While even the simple i.i.d. model fits the data well (the pseudo-R2 -oneminus the
ratio of the likelihood at the estimated parameters over the likelihood at zero -is60.5 per-
cent), introducing random effects increases the log likelihood significantly: the pseudo-R2
increases to 69.7 percent. The additional inclusion of an autoregressive component is also
statistically significant, the pseudo-R2 now rises to 70.1 percent. The prediction success is
about 89 percent for all three models, the same as for the logit models.
Our most important results relate to the coefficients of the option value. Taking ac-
count of the intertemporal correlations in the panel appears to be very important. The numeri-
cal value of the option value coefficient is severely underestimated in the i.i.d. model. With
random effects (capturing individual specific unobserved variables) and an autoregressive
error (capturing the declining influence of shocks, such as an illness), the coefficient estimate
of the option value quadruples and is estimated much more precisely. This also holds for the
"endogenous" specification, although to a lesser extent (see Borsch-Supan, 1999).
There is little change in the other explanatory variables across disturbance specifica-
tions with one important exception: the estimated coefficients of the health variable. It is
coded 0 for ,,very poor" to 10 for ,,excellent". As expected, the coefficients are negative.
Less healthy workers retire earlier. In the i.i.d. model, health is more significant than the op-
tion value. However, as soon as unobserved population heterogeneity is accounted for, this
changes, and the estimated coefficient becomes somewhat smaller. This shows the impor-
tance to account for intertemporal linkages. In the absence of random effects, health appears
to capture unmeasured population heterogeneity that is taken out by the random effects to the
extent that it is time invariant.
5. Conclusions
Main point of the paper was to account for uncertainty and potential endogeneity of
the expected retirement income in models measuring the incentive effects of public pension
22rules on early retirement. We were able to bracket the coefficient estimates in an option value
model by the two extremes (all are eligible for disability benefits; nobody is eligible for dis-
ability benefits). However, using the endogenous specification (all those are ex ante eligible
for disability benefits who have ex post disability status) yields a badly upward biased coeffi-
cient, i.e., it badly exaggerates the incentive effects of pension provisions. We employ an
instrumental variable approach to correct for this endogeneity, using employment and human
capital characteristics as instruments in a first stage regression that generates a fitted probabil-
ity for the pathway "disabled".
We then proceeded to a more complicated stochastic model that accounts for random
effects (capturing individual specific unobserved variables) and an autoregressive error (cap-
turing the declining influence of shocks, such as an illness). Such a model can be interpreted
as some convenient functional form to account for individual-specific deviations from the
fitted expected retirement income as well, although the model is not structural since expected
retirement income enters the option value in a complicated nonlinear fashion, due to the
maximization over present discounted values. Our fullest specification yields a coefficient
estimate of the option value that is quadrupled relative to the i.i.d. case. Moreover, and it is
estimated much more precisely than by the i.i.d. model.
We thus have corrected for two effects vis-â-vis conventional models. First, we cor-
rected for the exaggerated option value coefficient due to uncertainty and endogeneity of ex-
pected retirement income. Second, we corrected for the underestimated option value coeffi-
cient in a model that disregards the panel nature of the data. By chance, the two effects
roughly compensate each other in our working sample of German workers aged 5 5-70.
What do the estimated magnitudes of the option value coefficients mean in practice?
Using the full model in Table 3,wecan simulate a shift from the currently less than actuari-
ally fair system of adjustment factors (see Figure 2) to an actuarial fair system. This change
would shift the cumulative retirement distribution function down from what it is currently,
depicted in Figure 5.Theeffect is most dramatic for very early retirement where the discrep-
ancy between disability and normal retirement incentives are the largest, see Figure 4. The
policy change would cause retirement at ages 59andbelow to drop from 28.6 percent to about
16.5 percent.
23References
Borsch-Supan, A., 1992, Population Aging, Social Security Design, and Early Retirement,
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148, 533-557.
Borsch-Supan, A., and Hajivassiliou, V., 1993, Smooth Unbiased Multivariate Probability
Simulators for Limited Dependent Variable Models. Journal of Econometrics 58, 347-
368.
Borsch-Supan, A., und R. Schnabel, 1998a, Social Security and Declining Labor Force Par-
ticipation in Germany, American Economic Review 88.2, 173-178.
Borsch-Supan, A., und R. Schnabel, 1998b, Social Security and Retirement in Germany, in: J.
Gruber and D.A. Wise (eds), International Social Security Comparions, University of
Chicago Press: Chicago, in press.
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (BMA), 1997, Statistisches Taschenbuch,
Bonn: Bundespresseamt.
Burkhauser, R., 1991, An Introduction to the German Socio-Economic Panel For English
Speaking Researchers, mimeo, Syracuse University
Gruber, J., and D.A. Wise (eds), 1999, Social Security and RetirementAround the World.
University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
Lumbsdaine, R.L., J.H. Stock, and D.A. Wise, 1992, Three models of Retirement: Computa-
tional Complexity versus Predictive Validity, in D.A. Wise, ed., Topics in the Eco-
nomics ofAging, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 16-60.
Meghir, C. and E. Whitehouse, 1997, Labour Market Transitions and Retirement of Men in
the UK, Journal of Econometrics 79, 327-3 54.
Rust, J., 1990, Behavior of Male Workers at the End of the Life Cycle: An Empirical Analysis
of States and Controls, in: D.A. Wise (ed.) Issues in the Economics ofAging, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Rust, J., and C. Phelan, 1997, How Social Security and Medicare Affect Retirement Behavior
in a World of Incomplete Markets, Econometrica 65(4), 781-831.
Schmidt, P., 1995, Die Wahi des Rentenalters -Theoretischeund empirische Analyse des
Rentenzugangsverhaltens in West- und Ostdeutschland, Lang, Frankfurt.
Stock, J.H., and Wise, D.A., 1990, The Pension Inducement to Retire: An Option Value
Analysis, in: D.A. Wise (ed.) Issues in the Economics ofAging, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1990, 205-30.
Sueyoshi, G.T., 1989, Social Security and The Determinants of Full and Partial Retirement:
A Competing Risk Analysis, NBER Working Paper 3113, Cambridge.
Verband deutscher Rentenversicherungstrager (VdR), 1997, Die Rentenversicherung in Zei-
ireihen, Frankfurt am Main.
24</ref_section>